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BANKING ON BIOMETRICS: Y OUR BANK’S NEW HIGH-TECH M ETHOD OF IDENTIFICATION
M AY M EAN GIVING UP Y OUR PRIVACY
Beverly Dennis, hoping to receive free samples in the mail, completed a
marketing survey. 1 To her surprise, she not only received those free samples;
she also received the attentions of a convicted rapist.2 What the Ohio
grandmother did not know when she filled out her questionnaire was that her
answers were sent to a Texas prison, where inmates would later process her
personal information.3 Ms. Dennis is not alone. Many privacy horror stories
appear in the news on a regular basis.4
Now imagine this – your insurance company obtains a detailed list of
your shopping habits,5 finding that you regularly purchase high-fat foods, red
1

Ms. Dennis completed a questionnaire for Metromail Corp., a direct marketing firm, revealing
information such as her address, date of birth, marital status and level of income. James Rule
& Lawrence Hunter, Privacy Wrongs: Corporations Have More Right to Your Data Than
You Do, W ASHINGTON M ONTHLY, Nov. 1996, at 17.
2
Id. Hal Parfait, a Texas inmate convicted of breaking into his neighbor’s house and raping
her, sent Ms. Dennis a twelve-page sexually explicit letter. ABC Primetime Live: Inmates, Inc.
(ABC television broadcast, Feb. 18, 1998). Parfait bought Ms. Dennis’ information from a
fellow inmate working for Metromail Corp. Id. What is most troubling is that he purchased
her information for a mere twenty-five cents. See id.
3
See id. Prison labor is used for a variety of purposes by both private companies and
governmental agencies. See id. Some companies hire prisoners for telemarketing purposes
and taking airline ticket reservations. Id. In 1998, inmates in thirty-three states processed
personal information. Id. Ms. Dennis sued Metromail and the prison system, and Metromail
no longer uses prison labor. Mike Ward, Ex-prison Official Indicted Over ’93 Data-entry
Deal; Related Suit, A USTIN A MERICAN-STATESMAN, Sept. 26, 1998, at B3. In 1995, Texas
barred prisons from accepting work from private companies. Id.
4
For example, Mallory Hughes of Florida received a letter from televangelist Oral Roberts,
suggesting that, for a donation, Roberts would intercede with God on Hughes’ behalf, to help
Hughes with a debt problem. Sandra Byrd Petersen, Note, Your Life as an Open Book: Has
Technology Rendered Personal Privacy Virtually Obsolete?, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 163, 166
(1995). When Margaret Davis of California discovered she was pregnant, she ordered a
maternity catalog. She received catalogs and offers for free samples from other companies.
Unfortunately, Ms. Davis miscarried. The offers still came, even after the Davis’ contacted
the companies to tell them to remove their name from mailing lists. Some companies even sent
birthday cards around the time her baby was to be born, and Ms. Davis received telephone
calls congratulating her on the new addition to her family. It finally got to the point where
Davis’ husband had to screen the phone calls and open all the mail. Id. at 167
5

More than half of all grocery stores in the United States offer discounts and incentives to
their shoppers if the shoppers participate in the frequent shopper, or loyalty card, programs.
Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Bargains at a Price: Shopper’s Privacy; Cards Let Supermarkets
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meat, alcohol, and tobacco products.6 Worse yet, your insurance company
learns that you may suffer from diabetes, high blood pressure, or any number
of other disorders.7 Without warning, you are considered to be a high risk and
your rates increase. The problem is that the insurance company did not obtain
this information from your medical insurance claim form. Instead, your
insurance company found out from examining data gathered from your bank’s
newest method of customer identification.8
As scary as the previous scenarios sound, they are not only possible,
but also very likely if action is not taken soon. The abundance of computers,
both at the office and at home, has made it much easier and more profitable for
companies to gather and disseminate information that most Americans would

Collect Data, W ASHINGTON POST, Dec. 31, 1998, at A01 (“Six of ten supermarket companies
electronically collect customer data or plan to soon, about twice the proportion at the
beginning of the decade, according to the Food Marketing Institute.”). The customer trades
information about herself in order to obtain these discounts, as the stores track sales through
a magnetic stripe card. Id. The stores can then target their coupons to specific customers,
based on the customers’ buying habits. Id. Some stores claim that the program fosters
customer loyalty. Id. Others claim that they can better serve customers by monitoring
particular sales. See R.J. Ignelzi, It’s in the Cards; Frequent-shopper Discounts Sometimes
Net a Loss of Privacy, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB ., Apr. 7, 1998, at E-1. Tracking a customer’s
sales reaps benefits for government agencies as well. One store acknowledged that, pursuant
to subpoenas issued by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the store released
information on customers’ purchases. Id. The DEA was interested in whether a suspected
drug dealer purchased a large supply of plastic sandwich bags, which are often used to
package drugs. Id.
6
See Petersen, supra note 4, at 168-69 (noting that insurance companies could monitor your
shopping habits to see if you regularly purchased items that would indicate an unhealthy
lifestyle). The California legislature responded to the proliferation of supermarket loyalty
cards and possible detrimental effects on privacy by enacting the Supermarket Club Card
Disclosure Act of 1999. See S.B. 926, 1999-00 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1999) (to be codified at
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1749.60 – 1749.65). Effective July 1, 2000, the Act prohibits stores
from selling and sharing personal information except under certain specified
circumstances. See id.
7
Certain medical information may be inadvertently obtained from different methods of
biometric identification. See infra note 184. Biometrics refers to the method of verifying the
identity of an individual based on a particular trait such as a fingerprint, voice pattern, or
other physical or behavioral characteristic. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
8
New methods of identification in the banking industry include the use of biometric
identifiers. See infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text. The recently-enacted GrammLeach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act removes previous restrictions on the financial
service industry, now allowing banks, brokerage firms, and insurance companies to affiliate
into one institution. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
See infra notes 141-148 and accompanying text.
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consider private.9 The ease with which companies buy and sell a consumer’s
private information, most often without the consumer’s knowledge,10 must be
restricted. Americans need some way to protect themselves from threats to
their privacy. 11
I. INTRODUCTION
The vast amount of information stored in databases is increasingly
subject to computer hackers and other unauthorized users. Some concerns
over the storage and dissemination of this information, other than those
previously mentioned, are the potential for identity theft and fraud.12 In order
to reduce the fears of fraud and misuse of personal information, government
agencies and private corporations are turning to the high-tech world of
biometrics to be sure that you are who you say you are.13 But what is the
9

See William J. Fenrich, Note, Common Law Protection of Individuals’ Rights in Personal
Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 951 (1996) (noting that we leave an information trail
through birth, death, and marriage records, by using a credit card or supermarket loyalty card,
and by writing a check). See also Jonathan P. Graham, Privacy, Computers, and the
Commercial Dissemination of Personal Information, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1395 (1987) (noting
the ease with which companies gather and release information due to the use computerized
databases).
10
There is currently a profitable $1.5 billion market in personal information – information that
is “largely hidden from public view.” Joel Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in
Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771, 776 (1999) (noting the privacy problems
specific to electronic commerce).
11
This article concerns privacy as “information privacy,” generally defined as “the right to
control how information about oneself is used by those to whom it is disclosed.” Petersen,
supra note 4, at 166. (calling for a Congressionally created right to information privacy).
Informational privacy is also described as “freedom from unwanted disclosure of personal
data.” Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government: Some
Reflections on the Mechanisms For Privacy Protection, 4 W M. & M ARY BILL OF RTS. J. 455,
458 (1995).
12
See generally Kristen S. Provenza, Notes & Comments, V. Privacy: Identity Theft:
Prevention and Liability, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 319, 319 (1999). Provenza details a rather
scary story of a man who purchased vehicles, incurred debt, and broke various laws – all
using someone else’s identity. See id. Almost everyone knows someone who has had a
similar experience. The author of this comment was contacted a few years ago from her
county’s Department of Human Services when someone (other than this author) attempted to
obtain state entitlement benefits using her social security number.
13
See, e.g., Check Fraud: Check Fraud Losses Rising Rapidly Despite Banks’ Growing Use
of Technology, BNA BANKING DAILY, May 2, 1997, at D2. Financial institutions in California,
using a fingerprinting program, noted an eight-five percent decrease in losses from check
fraud. See Phil Britt, High-tech Identification Systems Come of Age; Biometrics in Banks;
Includes Related Article on Privacy, A MERICAN’S COMMUNITY BANKER, June 1998, at 22. In

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 33 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 5

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

gathering of this very personal information doing to the privacy rights of
American citizens? This comment attempts to answer that question and then
presents possible safeguards to ensure the safety of our own biometric
identities.
This Comment investigates privacy implications stemming specifically
from the use of biometrics in the banking industry. Part II of this comment
defines biometrics.14 The various types of, and uses for, this technology are
presented in this section. Part III investigates the right to privacy. 15 The history
of the right of an individual to protect her privacy is then presented, and the
sources of this fundamental right are identified. Part IV details the modern
trend of the use of biometrics in the banking industry. 16 An analysis is then
made concerning the implications of privacy protection of this information. This
comment concludes in Part V with suggestions for potential legislation
necessary to protect biometric information gathered for identification and
verification purposes in the banking industry. 17
II. BIOMETRICS
“Biometrics” refers to the techniques and methods used to identify
individuals based on a physical characteristic or particular trait unique to that
individual.18 While the name may sound like something out a popular sciencefiction movie,19 the idea behind using biometrics for identification and

Charlotte, North Carolina, First Union reported a forty percent decrease during the first year
of its fingerprinting program. See Id.
14
See infra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
15
See infra notes 84-114 and accompanying text.
16
See infra notes 183-193 and accompanying text.
17
See infra notes 207-231 and accompanying text.
18
Hearing on Biometrics and the Future of Money Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and
Int’l Monetary Policy Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv., 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998)
(statement of Jeffrey S. Dunn, Chairman, Biometric Consortium). The Biometric Consortium
serves as “a Government focal point for research, development, test, evaluation, and
application of biometric-based personal identification/authentication technology.” Joseph P.
Campbell, Jr., et al., Government Applications and Operations, in CTST GOVERNMENT
CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS
(1996),
available
at
<http://www.biometrics.org/REPORTS/CTSTG96> (visited Oct. 23, 1999). See also John D.
Woodward, Article, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the Concerns – Drafting
the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. PITT . L. REV. 97, 99 (1997).
19
The use of biometrics has fascinated moviegoers for many years. Mission: Impossible,
Demolition Man, True Lies, and the many James Bond movies have depicted various forms of
biometric identification. See, e.g., Richard Des Ruisseaux, High Tech ID: Prepare to Have
Your Body Parts Scanned, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, KY), July 13, 1998, at 01C.
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verification certainly is not new. 20 The procedure in different systems varies,
but generally consists of four steps.21 Upon enrollment, the physical
characteristic or trait is scanned, and the unique features are converted into a
digital code.22 The code is then stored, either in a database, on a smart-card,
or in a barcode format.23 When the individual seeks access to the system, she
is scanned again and compared to the digital code that has previously been
stored.24
Biometrics can be used for identification, in comparing one person to
the complete database of information.25 Biometrics is also used to verify that
the user is who he claims to be.26 The reliability and suitability for a particular
purpose depends on the type of biometric identifier used. The biometric

20

For instance, fingerprinting as a means of identification has been used in the criminal law
arena since the early 1900’s. See Vincent J. Gnoffo, Article, Requiring a Thumbprint for
Notarized Transactions: The Battle Against Document Fraud, 31 J. M ARSHALL L. REV. 803,
803-804 (1998) (providing a brief history of fingerprinting in the criminal law setting and
analyzing California’s requirement of a thumbprint for all notary services). See also Frederick
M. Avolio, Buyer’s Guide: Biometrically Speaking, NETWORK COMPUTING, Aug. 23, 1999.
Even retinal scanning is not new. The technology behind scanning the retina as a means of
identification has been available since 1976. Sharon Latka-Davis, IrisIdent ATM Security
System Catches Eye of Bankers, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester, MA), July 22, 1996, at C1.
21
Bill Siuru, Iris Recognition Systems, ELECTRONICS NOW , Feb. 1999, at 41.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
See Campbell, et al., supra note 18 (“Biometric recognition can be used in identification
mode, where the biometric system identifies a person from the entire enrolled population by
searching a database for a match.”) (emphasis in original). This is also called “one-to-many
matching.” Hearing on Biometrics and the Future of Money Before the Subcomm. on
Domestic and Int’l Monetary Policy Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv., 105th Cong. , 2nd Sess.
(1998) (statement of Jeffrey S. Dunn, Chairman, Biometric Consortium). See also Woodward,
supra note 18, at 100 (“Identification is defined as the ability to identify a person from among
all those enrolled, i.e. all those whose biometric measurements have been collected in the
database. Identification seeks to answer the question: ‘Do I know who you are?’”).
26
See Campbell, et al., supra note 18 (“A [biometric] system can also be used in verification
mode, where the biometric system authenticates a person’s claimed identity from his/her
previously enrolled pattern.”) (emphasis in original). This is also referred to as “one-to-one
matching.” Hearing on Biometrics and the Future of Money Before the Subcomm. on
Domestic and Int’l Monetary Policy Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv., 105th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1998) (statement of Jeffrey S. Dunn, Chairman, Biometric Consortium). See also Woodward,
supra note 18, at 100 (“[Verification] involves the authentication of a person’s claimed
identity from his previously enrolled pattern. Verification seeks to answer the question: ‘ Are
you who you claim to be?’”).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 33 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 5

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

system should be user-friendly and accurate,27 and it must be based on a
distinguishable trait.28 Ideally, the system would also collect data in a nonintrusive manner29 and operate at a high speed.30 The technology is becoming
more widely used, as prices fall and the systems become more financially
viable.31

27

Accuracy in biometrics is described by three terms: (1) the false acceptance rate (defined as
the percentage of imposters accepted), (2) the false rejection rate (defined as the percentage
of authorized users the system rejects), and (3) the equal-error rate (described as the process
of adjusting the decision threshold so that the false acceptance rate equals the false rejection
rate). Campbell, et al., supra note 18. See also Woodward, supra note 18, at 101. “The better
biometric systems have low equal error rates of less than 1%.” Hearing on Biometrics and
the Future of Money Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and Int’l Monetary Policy Comm. on
Banking and Fin. Serv., 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998) (statement of Jeffrey S. Dunn, Chairman,
Biometric Consortium).
28
Campbell, et al., supra note 18.
29
Woodward, supra note 18, at 101. Part of the notion of a system being non-intrusive is the
minimal amount of contact between the scanning device and the person being scanned. See
id.
30
Woodward, supra note 18, at 101.
31
James Menendez, Biometrics useful in health care, e-commerce; Technology Information,
COMPUTING CANADA, April 16, 1999, at 25 (“Until recently, the technology was extremely
expensive, but falling chip and scanner prices have made biometric solutions feasible for even
the smallest applications, including personal desktop PCs.”). “The price of biometric devices
has plummeted. Five years ago, the smallest fingerprint reader sold by Identicator
Technology was the size of a telephone and cost $2,000; today, it’s the size of two sugar
cubes and sells for $99. In five years, a similar gizmo may cost $15.” Pamela Sherrid, You
Can’t Forget This Password: Hint: It’s Your Face, Iris, or Fingerprint, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT , May 17, 1999, at 49.
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A. Types of Biometric Identifiers
Biometrics ranges from the more common fingerprinting to highly
sophisticated retinal scans. On the low end of reliability32 lie facial imaging or
face recognition,33 hand geometry, 34 voice recognition,35 and signature
recognition.36 These systems are less reliable partly because changes occur
to the physical aspects of the biometric identifier over time.37

32

See Woodward, supra note 18, at 105-107. Woodward categorizes the various biometric
identifiers into what he refers to as “high,” “lesser,” and “esoteric” biometrics. (“The use of
the High Biometrics, Lesser Biometric and Esoteric Biometrics categories is done for
organizational purposes. . . ; the categorization is not based on any rigorous technical
formula.”) Id. at 102, n.29.
33
“Face recognition is a noninvasive process where a portion of the subject’s face is
photographed and the resulting image is reduced to a digital code.” Woodward, supra note
18, at 106. The system by Visionics uses a camera that can take an acceptable picture from
hundreds of feet away. Ashley Dunn, The Cutting Edge; The Password is Biometrics; HighTech Identification Systems are Moving Into Corporate and PC Worlds, Offering Log-On
Security in the Blink of an Eye or the Tap of a Finger, L.A. TIMES , Dec. 7, 1998, at C1.
34
Hand geometry measures the length, width, and height of the hand and fingers. See
Woodward, supra note 18, at 105. One advantage of a hand geometry system is the fact that
it requires a small amount of computer storage, as opposed to some of the other methods.
See id. at 106.
35
“Voice recognition involves taking the acoustic signal of a person’s voice and converting it
to a unique digital code which can then be stored in a template.” Woodward, supra note 18,
at 107. Usually, the user repeats a pre-determined phrase for identification. See id. Systems
measure voice cadence, tone and pitch to determine a match. See Britt, supra note 13, at 22.
36
In the arena of biometrics, signature recognition, also referred to as signature dynamics, is
not merely the comparison of two signatures. See Woodward, supra note 18, at 107. Instead,
the system compares the shape and speed of the letter strokes, the pressure one puts upon
the writing instrument, and the number of times the writing instrument leaves the surface. Id.
See also Mary Deibel, Biometrics: The New Wave of Identification, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake
City, UT), June 2, 1999, at C02.
37
Injuries to the hand can affect hand geometry. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Brave New Whorl; ID
Systems Using the Human Body are Here, But Privacy Issues Persist, W ASHINGTON POST,
Mar. 30, 1997, at H01. See also Woodward, supra note 18, at 106. Similarly, facial hair may
affect facial recognition, and identical twins or others who look alike can compromise the
system. Id. Emotions and illness can affect voice patterns. Id. at 107. Background noises
can also affect voice recognition systems. Chandrasekaran, supra note 37, at H01. Signature
recognition faces similar disadvantages, as injuries to the hand affect the way a person signs
her name. Dunn, supra note 33, at C1.
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Biometric identifiers with a high degree of reliability38 include retinal
scanning,39 iris scanning,40 and fingerprinting. These biometric identifiers are
less likely to change over time, and are unique to the individual.41 However,
these methods have their disadvantages as well.42
38

The retina and the iris are more reliable than fingerprints, because they contain more
“discriminators,” or identification points. John D. Woodward, Comment, Biometrics Offers
Security But Legal Worries, Too, A MERICAN BANKER, Aug. 23, 1996, at 11. The iris contains
more than 400 such discriminators, while the average fingerprint has only 68. Latka-Davis,
supra note 20, at C1. But see Kurt Loft, Eye on Tomorrow; The Information Obtained From a
Simple Scan of Your Eye’s Iris Could Replace the Need for ATM Cards and the PINs That
Go With Them, TAMPA TRIBUNE, July 26, 1999, at 4 (noting that fingerprints contain
approximately 35 reference points, while the iris has 266).
39
Retinal scanning is a process that maps the vein pattern of one’s retina, the innermost layer
of the eye. Woodward, supra note 18, at 102-103. A beam of light bounces off the retina, and
the pattern of the retina’s blood vessel structure is reduced to a digital code. Id. at 103.
40
Similar to retinal scanning, iris scanning maps the variation in the iris, the colored portion of
the eye. Woodward, supra note 18, at 103. Computers sort through the iris’s identifying
features of the corona, pits, filaments, crypts, striation, radial furrows and other structures.
Loft, supra note 38, at 4. A video camera takes a high-resolution image of the iris. Dunn,
supra note 33, at C1. An accurate image can be captured from three feet away, and a match
can be made in two or three seconds. Id. Systems can scan the iris through contact lenses
and most glasses, except reflective sunglasses. Loft, supra note 38, at 4.
41
However, one reporter suggests that systems based on IriScan and other companies
specializing in iris scanning can be compromised by the use of a high-resolution photograph.
Dunn, supra note 33, at C1. But see Siuru, supra note 21, at 41 (“Since the technique relies
on the physiological response to light and natural pupillary oscillation, it cannot be fooled by
a photograph or another substitute for a real human eye.”). See also How the Eyeball
Scanner Will Know It’s You, ST . LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 5, 1996, at 5C (“The camera
shoots the iris several times, verifying in seconds that the pupil moves and thus that it is a
real eye rather than a photo.”). Dunn also comments that a carefully constructed artificial
finger can fool a fingerprint scanner and morbidly suggests that a freshly severed finger can
also circumvent the system. Dunn, supra note 33, at C1. Cf. Joe War, Ex-Louisvillian
Pioneers Access to Computers by Fingerprint, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, KY), May 30,
1999, at 01E (The technology of finger scanning can differentiate between live fingers and
dead fingers, artificial fingers and live fingers, and photographs.).
42
See, e.g. Chandrasekaran, supra note 37, at H01. Iris recognition often requires a large
amount of computer memory. Id. Retinal scanning often requires close physical contact, and
many suggest that the method may not receive public approval. Id. Fingerprinting or finger
imaging is not well suited in some environments, such as manual laborers or construction
workers who may not be able to provide an acceptable scan. Ross Snel, On-Line Banking:
Factors Found to Affect Accuracy of Biometric identification Systems, A MERICAN BANKER,
Apr. 1, 1999, at 13. See also Chandrasekaran, supra note 37, at H01. The system can be set
up to compensate for injuries. Joe Ward, supra note 41, at O1E. If one finger is injured, the
customer just substitutes with a previously scanned finger. Id. Residue on the fingers also

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol33/iss3/5

8

McGuire: Banking on Biometrics

2000]

BANKING ON BIOMETRICS

The use of biometrics for identification and verification implicates
concerns from many sectors. The use of biometric identifiers worries privacy
advocates as well as religious groups.43 Pat Robertson, founder of the
Christian Coalition, believes that the Bible foretells of the danger associated
with the increased use of biometric identifiers.44 He announced that “[t]he Bible
says the time is going to come when you cannot buy or sell except when a mark
is placed on your hand or forehead.”45 Other problems stem from some
cultures objecting to the physical aspects of scanning.46 Also, some people
may fear that the scanners contribute to the spread of germs.47 Other
disadvantages relate to the development of systems that adequately
accommodate the disabled.48
B. Applications of Biometrics

affects the system, and natural oils present in the skin may adhere to the scanner, creating
difficulties for future scanning. Woodward, supra note 18, at 105. Similarly, weather
conditions may create problems for scanning equipment when the scanner becomes wet and
dirty from users coming in from winter weather. Britt, supra note 13, at 22.
43
Chandrasekaran, supra note 37, at H01.
44
See Chandrasekaran, supra note 37, at H01. See also Eric Niiler, Human Bar Codes; Forget
Those Passwords, Biometrics is the Future – and Present – Identifier, SAN-DIEGO UNIONTRIBUNE, May 13, 1998, at E-1 (“[Religious leaders] point to biblical warnings about the ‘mark
of the beast’ in the Book of Revelations that described a world in which everyone was
required to have three 6’s tattooed on their forehead and right hand in order to buy or sell
goods in the pre-apocalyptic world.”).
45
Chandrasekaran, supra note 37, at H01.
46
The Japanese and other Asian cultures are adverse to the physical aspects of some of
these systems. Woodward, supra note 18, at 104, n.47.
47
Germs can be transferred from one user to the next when the users share a scanner. See
Chandrasekaran, supra note 37, at H01. However, systems using iris or retinal scanning do
not require physical touching. See supra notes 38-42. Therefore, these systems do not
implicate any fears of transferring germs from one user to the next.
48
Chandrasekaran, supra note 37, at H01. Kevin McQuade, the president of marketing for
Sensar, one of the companies currently marketing iris -scanning equipment for use in
Automatic Teller Machines, noted that the system accommodates anyone from the four-footnine to six-foot-nine range. Latka-Davis, supra note 20, at C1. That range should
accommodate wheelchair users. Id. McQuade also notes that one form of cancer alters the
iris over time. Id. Individuals suffering from tremors, as those with advanced stages of
Huntington’s Disease or Parkinson’s Disease, may encounter problems with inaccurate data.
Id. Blind individuals can still use a system based on iris recognition if their irises are intact.
Loft, supra note 38, at 4.
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Biometrics has many applications from varied governmental functions49
to those utilized in private organizations.50 Government applications range
from military51 and national security measures52 to the use in law enforcement
and prison population identification.53 Recently, there has been a movement in
the states to use biometrics in efforts to prevent welfare fraud.54 Other
49

In the Turkish Parliament, finger scanners guarantee that it is the members themselves
casting votes. Ruisseaux, supra note 19, at O16. Jamaica uses biometrics for their national
registration system. Reports from the States, in BIOMETRICS HUM. SERV. USER GROUP (Conn.
Dep’t
of
Soc.
Serv.),
Aug.
1999,
available
at
<http://www/dss.state.ct.us/digital/news15/bhsug15.html> (visited Oct. 23, 1999). The
Jamaican government issues cards to citizens for a variety of purposes including voter
registration, health-care benefits and driver’s licenses. Id.
50
In 1998, the United States government was the largest user of biometrics. Deibel, supra
note 36, at C02. During that year, the government spent $140 million on biometric equipment,
while private industries spent only $33 million. Id.
51
In Fort Sill, Oklahoma, military officials issue basic training inductees a stored value card
using fingerprint recognition for various military services like shopping at the PX , buying
clothes, and getting haircuts. Hearing on Biometrics and the Future of Money Before the
Subcomm. on Domestic and Int’l Monetary Policy Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv., 105th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998) (statement of Jeffrey S. Dunn, Chairman, Biometric Consortium). A
similar program was being tested on military retirees who receive benefits overseas. Id.
52
Woodward, supra note 18, at 109. See also Campbell, et al., supra note 18. Biometrics
ensures security at the Pentagon, the White House, and missile silos. Ruisseaux, supra note
19. Retina scanning devices control access to secure areas for the CIA, the FBI, and NASA.
Eric Slater, Not All See Eye to Eye on Biometrics; Iris and Fingerprint Scanners May Soon
Come to the Corner Bank or Market, Critics Fear Loss of Privacy and Theft of Electronic
Identities, L.A. TIMES , Apr. 28, 1998, at A1.
53
The Cook County Sheriff’s Department in Illinois reportedly uses eye scanning to ensure
the identity of prisoners. Chandrasekaran, supra note 37, at H01. Persons under house arrest
in some areas check in with the authorities by using a voice recognition system. Id. In
Pennsylvania, the Lancaster County Prison releases prisoners only after verifying their
identity through iris scanning. Slater, supra note 52, at A1. The Sarasota County Detention
Center in Florida was installing a similar system. Siuru, supra note 21, at 41.
54
Woodward, supra note 18, at 110. The General Accounting Office (GA O) estimates the
costs of fraud in state entitlement programs as over $10 billion a year. Campbell, et al., supra
note 18. As of March 1998, the states using biometric identifiers included Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York and Texas. CONNECTICUT DEP’T
OF SOC . SERV., REPORT TO THE GENERAL A SSEMBLY DSS DIGITAL IMAGING PROJECT (1998).
While most states’ programs use finger imaging, Massachusetts was testing facial imaging,
and Sacramento County, California was using hand geometry. Id. Connecticut has since
chosen to use facial recognition. Reports from the States, in BIOMETRICS HUM. SERV. USER
GROUP
(Conn.
Dep’t
of
Soc.
Serv.)
June
1999,
available
at
<http://www/dss.state.ct.us/digital/news14/bhsug14.html> (visited Oct. 23, 1999). The use of
finger imaging in state entitlement programs prevents an individual from registering under
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governmental uses include controlling international borders and immigration,55
preventing unauthorized access to secured buildings and computer systems,56
and monitoring driving records of certain commercial drivers.57
multiple names. See generally James J. Killerlane III, Note, Finger Imaging: A 21st Century
Solution to Welfare Fraud at our Fingertips, 22 FORDHAM U. L.J. 1327 (1995) (detailing the
problem of fraud in entitlement programs). See also Jennifer K. Constance, Comment,
Automated Fingerprint Identification System: Issues and Options Surrounding Their Use to
Prevent Welfare Fraud, 59 A LB. L. REV. 399 (1995) (presenting potential Constitutional
invasion of privacy and due process concerns in the use of fingerprint identification for
welfare programs). One of the problems in using fingerprints as a method of identification is
that applicants may feel stigmatized because the most common use of fingerprints is by law
enforcement officials in solving crimes. See id. at 406-407. But see Few See Stigma in
Fingerprinting, Survey Indicates, A MERICAN BANKER, Dec. 23, 1996, at 2A (relating data that
seventy-five percent of those subjects surveyed felt “somewhat comfortable” or “very
comfortable” with the use of fingerprint scans to prevent identity fraud).
55
The United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) implemented a system at
several airports in the United States to ease check in of frequent international travelers.
Woodward, supra note 18, at 111. Called INSPASS (INS Passenger Accelerated Service
System), this system allows frequent travelers to the United Stated to forego the traditional
personal interview and inspection portion of the entry process, providing quicker admission.
Campbell, supra note 18. INSPASS uses hand geometry for verification. Id. The traveler
enters a previously-issued card into an automated machine, enters his flight number, and
places his hand into the hand geometry reader. United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) Office of Inspections, INS Passenger Accelerated Service System (INSPASS)
Briefing Paper, available at <http://www.biometrics.org/REPORTS/INSPASS2.html> (visited
Oct. 23, 1999). If the hand geometry pattern matches that obtained when the traveler enrolled
in the program, the traveler gains admission. Id. Travelers currently use INSPASS at
international airports in Los Angeles, California; Miami, Florida; Newark, New Jersey; New
York (JFK) and San Francisco, California. Id. Enrollment in the INSPASS program is open to
citizens of the United States, Bermuda, and Canada who do not have a criminal record and
travel to the United States at least three times a year. Id. An enrollment form may be obtained
via the Internet at <http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/formsfee/forms/i-823.htm>.
Canada uses a version of INPASS called CANPASS. Ronald J. Hays, INS, INS
Passenger
Accelerated
Service
System
(INSPASS),
available
at
<http://www.biometrics.org/REPORTS/INSPASS.html> (visited Oct. 23, 1999). The system in
Canada is similar but uses fingerprint scanning instead of hand geometry. Id. CANPASS is
used at Vancouver International Airport, with the goal of easing the transfer of people and
goods between Canada and the United States. Campbell, supra note 18. In Scobey,
Montana, officials at the United States-Canadian border use a voice recognition system to
assist in border crossings. Woodward, supra note 18, at 110.
The INS also has a program called PORTPASS. See id. PORTPASS uses voice recognition at
a vehicle crossing at the United States-Canadian border. Id.
At the United States-Mexican border at Otay Mesa, a facial recognition system is in
place to ease travel between the two countries. See Niiler, supra note 44, at E1. As the
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In response to the increasing use of biometrics, the Biometrics
Consortium was chartered in 1995 by the Facilities Protection Committee, a
committee that reports to the Security Policy Board.58 The Biometrics
Consortium is a working group to “serve as a Government focal point for
research, development, test, evaluation, and application of biometric-based
personal identification / authentication technology.”59 While the Biometrics
Consortium deals exclusively with governmental applications, the group also
assesses issues that arise in varying biometric applications.60

vehicle approaches the border in a special commuter lane, a transponder attached to the
vehicle signals the booth and activates the system. Id. The driver’s facial features are then
compared to information compiled in the database. Id. The system saves time for those
travelers who often commute between the two countries. Id.
56
Woodward, supra note 18, at 111.
57
Woodward, supra note 18, at 111, n.107. Through the use of biometric identifiers in
identifying commercial drivers, the government can better monitor their driving records, in
response to concerns that some drivers obtained licenses in multiple states to reduce the
appearance of traffic violations. Id. Congress mandated that the Secretary of Transportation
adopt standards that include requirements that commercial licenses issued after January 1,
2001 “include unique identifiers (which may include biometric identifiers) to minimize fraud
and duplication.” 49 U.S.C. § 31308(2) (1999). California is one state that requires a
thumbprint or fingerprint on every application for a driver’s license, treating commercial
licensees the same as all other drivers. See CAL. V EH. CODE § 12800 (Deering 1999).
The California Supreme Court addressed the collection and dissemination of
fingerprint data in Perkey v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 721 P.2d 50 (Cal. 1986). The
Court held that the fingerprint requirement did not violate due process. Id. at 53.
However, the Court found that the department’s dissemination of fingerprint data for
purposes unrelated to motor vehicle safety violated several provisions of the state’s
civil and vehicle codes. Id. at 53-54.
58
Hearing on Biometrics and the Future of Money Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and
Int’l Monetary Policy Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv., 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998)
(statement of Jeffrey S. Dunn, Chairman, Biometric Consortium). President William Clinton
established the Security Policy Board. Id.
59
Id. (quoting the Biometric Consortium’s Charter).
60
Lisa A. Alyea and Dr. Joseph P. Campbell, Jr., Update on the US Government’s Biometric
Consortium, available at <http://www.biometrics.org/REPORTS/CTST96/> (visited Oct. 23,
1999).
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Biometrics is also useful in the private sector. Preventing unauthorized
access to computers is just one of many possible applications.61 In this arena,
biometrics replaces a personal identification number (PIN) or password that
protects company information from unauthorized access.62 PIN’s or passwords
can be lost or forgotten. More importantly, they can be stolen, compromised or
observed by prying eyes. Because biometric identifiers are unique to the
individual, only the person with a match is allowed access.63
The list of possible applications in the private sector is endless.64
However, some of the more common uses are automated time and attendance
records65 and security measures.66 Walt Disney World in Orlando, Florida
reportedly uses a hand scanning system to prevent unauthorized use of
season passes.67 Biometric identifiers are also being used to limit the sale of
alcohol and tobacco to minors.68 Biometric technology even found its way into
the Olympics, when hand-scanning devices controlled access to the Olympic
Village during the Atlanta, Georgia Olympic Games.69 Similarly, an iris
recognition system monitored access to weapons in the Nagano, Japan Winter
Olympics.70
61

James Menendez, supra note 31, at 25. Finger-scanners can be attached to computers to
eliminate the need for passwords. Chandrasekaran, supra note 37, H01. Charles Schwab &
Co. uses finger imaging for security checks on employees. Woodward, supra note 38, at 11.
62
Another method similar to biometrics, called the Biopassword, can be used in conjunction
with passwords. Dunn, supra note 33, at C1. This technology monitors computer keystrokes,
determining the differences between typists based on the typist’s speed and cadence. Id.
Biopassword is very affordable, but because the system measures typing rhythm in
milliseconds, it is easily subjected to injuries in the hands and fingers. Id.
63
The match does not need to be exact. See Britt, supra note 13, at 22. In fact, variables in
the user and the equipment invariably dictate that the match will never be exact. See id.
(noting that “[t]here will always be some distortion introduced by the user, the screen or the
screening environment”).
64
It seems that any application is possible in the private sector. BMW is investigating the
use of fingerprint scanners to deter car theft. See Slater, supra note 52. BMW hopes to
design a car that starts only after the system identifies the correct driver by his fingerprint.
Id. In the near future, spectators may not even need a ticket to gain access to sporting
events, as a system using biometric identifiers is under development that would automatically
debit or charge the individual’s account. Siuru, supra note 21, at 41. The gun industry may
see biometrics as a novel safety device. See Elizabeth Weise, Body May Be Key to a
Foolproof ID, USA TODAY, Apr. 8, 1998, at 4D. Only the registered gun-owner, with a
matching fingerprint, will be able to fire it. Id.
65
Coca-Cola Co. replaced time cards with hand-scanning machines. Chandrasekaran, supra
note 37. Woolworth stores in Australia also substituted time clocks with biometrics, using a
system of finger scanning. Slater, supra note 52, at A1.
66
The use of security systems based on biometrics ranges from applications in places with
very limited access to common places where the public in general would not expect such high
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technology. Fingerprint scanners limit access to the inner vault of the Encino, California
branch of Century Bank. Slater, supra note 52, at A1. Wells Fargo Bank uses hand geometry
to prevent unauthorized access to the bank’s data centers. Kate Henry, Biometrics Prevent
Sleight of Hand at Wells Fargo, A CCESS CONTROL & SECURITY INTEGRATION, August 1999.
An elementary school in New Mexico, also using a hand geometry system, prevented a father
who lost a custody fight from attempting to pick up his child. See Deibel, supra note 36, at
C02.
67
Weise, supra note 64, at 4D. In a somewhat related application, the University of Georgia
has used a hand geometry system since 1972 to identify students on the unlimited meal plan,
thus preventing them from loaning their cards to others. Id.
68
Vending machines in Salem, Utah compare a user’s fingerprints with information stored on a
magnetic stripe card to ensure that the customer is eligible to purchase such age-restricted
items like tobacco and alcohol. Biometric Vending Machines in Full Swing at Salem Store,
SUPERMARKET NEWS, Oct. 4, 1999, at 32.
69
Chandrasekaran, supra note 37, at H01.
70
Officials regulated access to rifles and ammunition used in the biathlon at the Winter
Olympics in Nagano, Japan with an iris recognition system. Weise, supra note 64, at 4D.
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The use of biometrics is also catching on in the banking industry.
Customers without a bank account wishing to cash a payroll check are often
required to provide a fingerprint or thumbprint.71 Some banks even require a
thumbprint when a customer opens an account.72 In a related application, one
retail store uses fingerprint scanners to verify the identity of a customer wishing
to write a check for her purchase.73 MasterCard International and Visa USA
Inc. are studying the use of point-of-sale finger-scanners to prevent fraud by
verifying that the shopper truly is the authorized credit card user. 74
Voice recognition software can be used in the banking industry to
control access to account information.75 The technology can be linked with
existing telephone information systems.76 Voice recognition would be most
useful in situations when customers wish to transfer funds or obtain account
balances by telephone.77

71

See generally Patrick J. Waltz, Comment, On-Site Fingerprinting in the Banking Industry:
Inconvenience or Invasion of Privacy, 16 J. M ARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 597 (1998)
(discussing privacy concerns associated with fingerprinting as a requirement for check
cashing). Several banks in Colorado, Utah, Nevada, Arizona, and Texas require a fingerprint
before cashing a check for a non-account holder. Colorado Banks to Fingerprint to Stem
Fraud,
ACLU
NEWS
W IRE,
July
30,
1996,
available
at
<http://www.aclu.org/news/w073096a.html> (visited Sept. 9, 1999). The procedure is as
follows: the customer provides a fingerprint in order to cash a check. If the check clears,
nothing is done with the print. If the check is forged or counterfeit, the bank gives the check
and the fingerprint to law enforcement. Id. Florida banks are following suit. Banks
Increasingly Turn to Fingerprints, ACLU NEWS W IRE, Jan. 8, 1997, available at
<http://www.aclu.org/news/w010897b.html> (visited Sept. 3, 1999). Instead of the traditional
ink and paper method of fingerprinting, Florida banks use inkless pads to obtain the
thumbprint of customers. See id. No ink remains on the customer’s finger, but an ink-like
fingerprint appears on the check. Britt, supra note 13, at 22.
72
Great Western Bank in Florida requires a thumbprint before customers open an account.
Banks Increasingly Turn to Fingerprints, ACLU NEWS W IRE, Jan. 8, 1997, available at
<http://www.aclu.org/news/w010897b.html> (visited Sept. 3, 1999).
73
Fingerprint scanners are used in Kroger stores in Texas. Sunil Taneja, Keep an Eye on
Biometrics, CHAIN STORE A GE EXECUTIVE WITH SHOPPING CENTER A GE, July 1, 1999. The
system is voluntary for personal checks but mandatory for those customers wanting to cash
payroll checks. Id.
74
Chandrasekaran, supra note 37, at H01.
75
Sherrid, supra note 31, at 49.
76
Id. Chase Manhattan Bank investigated the use of voice recognition software to ensure
proper access to account information given over the telephone. Woodward, supra note 38, at
11.
77
See Sherrid, supra note 31, at 49.
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The trend of using biometric identifiers for identification at banks has
led to their use at many Automatic Teller Machines (ATM’s). The Purdue
Employees Federal Credit Union at Purdue University uses finger imaging at
remote ATM’s.78 Rapid Pay Machines, self-service check-cashing machines,
use facial recognition to identify customers.79 Banks in Texas use iris scanning
for identification of their customers.80 Customers of those banks do not even
need an ATM card.81 These machines use iris recognition in identification
mode, matching the customer’s iris to all those enrolled in the system. 82
What does the collection of such personally identifiable information
mean to the privacy of American citizens? In order to reach an answer to that
question, the right to privacy in the United States must first be examined.
III. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
“Privacy is like freedom: we do not recognize its importance until it is
taken away. In that sense, it is a personal right that we assume we have yet
take for granted – until something or someone infringes upon it.”83
A. Background of the Right to Privacy

78

Technology: Banks’ Future Security Could Be Built on Biometrics House Banking Panel
Told, BNA BANKING DAILY, May 21, 1998.
79
Helen Stock, Firm Uses Biometrics to Serve the Unbanked, A MERICAN BANKER, Oct. 1,
1999, at 12. The rapid pay machines are aimed towards those individuals without bank
accounts. Id. A similar system was first used by Mr. Payroll. Id. These companies cash
checks for a fee, marketing their services toward those individuals without access to
traditional bank accounts. Id.
80
Bank United installed ATM’s inside certain Kroger grocery stores in Dallas, Houston, and
Fort Worth, Texas. Leslie J. Nicholson, Iris-scanning ATMs Coming Online Today, DALLAS
M ORNING NEWS, May 13, 1999, at 10D.
81
Id. The ATM’s cameras are directly linked to the database that contains the customer’s
previously installed iris pattern. Id.
82
See id. Other biometric ATM systems store the customer’s identification information in his
ATM card or on a smart-card, rather than in the bank’s database. Id. See infra note 25-26
(describing the difference between identification and verification).
83
David H. Flaherty, Symposium, The Right to Privacy One Hundred Years Later: Article: On
the Utility of Constitutional Rights to Privacy and Data Protection, 41 CASE. W. RES . 831
(1991).
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Neither the text of the United States Constitution nor the Bill of Rights
explicitly mentions the right to privacy. However, the right to privacy is regarded
as one of the most fundamental of rights.84 One of the problems in fashioning
an appropriate scheme for privacy protection is the plethora of ways in which to
define privacy. 85
B. Sources of Privacy Protection

84

See, e.g., Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The makers
of our Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”). See
also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[T]he right
of privacy is a fundamental personal right, emanating ‘from the totality of the constitutional
scheme under which we live.’” quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)). In Griswold, Justice Harlan felt that the natural law approach was the
acceptable way to recognize privacy as a fundamental right. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499
(Harlan, J., concurring). See also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 11.7, at 390 (4th ed. 1991).
85
See BeVier, supra note 11, at 458 (“Privacy is a chameleon-like word; used denotatively to
designate a range of wildly disparate interests – from confidentiality of personal information
to reproductive autonomy – and connotatively to generate good will on behalf of whatever
interest is being asserted in its name.”). See also Richard S. Murphy, Article, Property Rights
in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381 (1996). Murphy
describes the right to privacy as follows:
The phrase “right to privacy” is a bit of a chameleon. Its uses range
from the right to be free from physical invasion of one’s home or person,
the right to make certain personal and intimate decisions free from
government interference, and the right to prevent commercial
“publicity” of one’s own name and image, to name three.
Id. Murphy’s article concerns the right to privacy as defined as the “control of information
concerning an individual’s person.” Id. Black’s Law Dictionary defines an invasion of
privacy as “an unjustified exploitation of one’s personality or intrusion into one’s personal
activity, actionable under tort law and sometimes under constitutional law.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 829 (7th ed. 1999).
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Privacy receives protection from many sources. The United States
Constitution protects individuals from governmental intrusion into privacy in
varying contexts.86 Federal legislation protects invasions of privacy in a variety
of industries and circumstances.87 Constitutions and statutes of many states
similarly provide protection for their citizens.88 Various actions are also
available under common law. 89
1. Privacy Protections Under the United States Constitution
As noted earlier, the right to privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution. However, in Griswold v. Connecticut,90 the United States Supreme
Court first held that the guarantees in the Bill of Rights create “zones of
privacy.”91 “[The] specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance,”92 thus creating “zones” of privacy. Since Griswold, the Court has
extended privacy protection to areas concerning marital decisions,93
reproductive choices,94 and judgments relating to the rearing and education of
children.95
86

Most of the amendments to the United States Constitution explicitly protect an individual
from governmental intrusion. See infra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
87
See infra notes 115-148 and accompanying text.
88
See infra notes 149-154 and accompanying text.
89
See infra notes 155-182 and accompanying text.
90
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
91
Id. The Griswold Court struck down a Connecticut statute prohibiting the distribution and
use of contraceptives among married couples. Id.
92
Id.
93
See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.28 (4th
ed. 1991). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that Virginia’s law banning
interracial marriages violates the Equal Protection Clause).
94
See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 84 §§ 14.27 and 14.29. See Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating a Texas law banning all abortions except to save the life of the
mother). See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1941) (holding that an Oklahoma law
that required the sterilization of all habitual criminals violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment). In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court declined
to extend the right to privacy to include the right of homosexuals to engage in consensual
sodomy. The Bowers Court limited the right to “a fundamental individual right to decide
whether or not to beget or bear a child.” Id. at 190.
95
See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating an Oregon law that
required all children aged eight to sixteen to attend public school). See also Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding that a Nebraska statute that prohibited the
teaching of subjects in schools in any language other than English was unconstitutional). In
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Court stated that “the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
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The right of association in the First Amendment96 creates one such
zone of privacy. 97 Similarly, the Third Amendment98 protects the privacy of
one’s home.99 The Fourth100 and Fifth101 Amendments protect against
government intrusions “of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of
life.”102 The Court has said that the Ninth Amendment103 also creates zones of
privacy. 104 The Fourteenth Amendment105 finds some support among the
Justices for creating a right to privacy. 106

preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” Id at 166. See also
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
96
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S.
CONST. amend. I
97
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-84. Freedom of association is a peripheral First Amendment right.
Id. See also NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
98
“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the
Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” U.S. CONST. amend. III.
99
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
100
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the places to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the right to privacy created by the Fourth Amendment
was described as “a right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and
particularly reserved to the people.” Id. at 656.
101
“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
“The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of
privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.” Griswold, 381
U.S. at 484.
102
Id. (quoting Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
103
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
104
In his concurring opinion in Griswold, Justice Goldberg stated that “[t]o hold that a right
so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as the right of privacy in
marriage may be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so many words by the first
eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no
effect whatsoever.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
105
“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000

19

Akron Law Review, Vol. 33 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 5

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

Regardless of which Constitutional Amendment creates a right to
privacy, the Constitution only protects an individual from government actors
infringing that individual’s privacy. 107 The Thirteenth Amendment, prohibiting
slavery, is the only Amendment that regulates conduct of individuals or private
entities rather than action by the government.108 “With respect to the conduct
of private individuals, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to find a privacy
right in personal information given voluntarily by an individual to private
parties.”109

citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
106
Waltz, supra note 71, at 602 (“Some Supreme Court Justices also suggest that the
Fourteenth Amendment independently preserves privacy rights,” citing Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding that a Nebraska statute that prohibited the teaching of
subjects in schools in any language other than English was unconstitutional)). In Meyer, the
Court described the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as “not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of like, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.” (citations omitted) Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. As Justice
Harlan stated in Griswold:
[T]he proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut
statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because the enactment violates basic values ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.’ While the relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one
or more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them
or any of their radiations. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own bottom.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J. concurring). See also, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(invalidating a Texas law banning all abortions except when to save the life of the mother)
(“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of
personal liberty and restriction upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court
determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
107
State action is required in order to prevail on a claim for invasion of a federal
constitutionally-based right of privacy. See generally, NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 84 at
§§ 12.1. Joint participation between the government and a private actor is considered state
action. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (holding that a
restaurant located on state-owned property and operating under a lease of said premises
could not discriminate). State action is not established merely because the government is
involved in some way. There must be a close nexus between the private and government
action. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974) (holding that a
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The closest the Court came to identifying a right to information privacy
was in Whalen v. Roe.110 In upholding a New York state law, which required the
recording of the names and addresses of individuals prescribed certain
drugs,111 the Court noted, in dicta, “the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data
banks or other massive government files.”112 However, the Court upheld the
law, finding that it was rationally related to a legitimate governmental goal of
controlling the distribution of illegal drugs.113 The Court did not reach any
decision concerning “the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data –
whether intentional or unintentional – or by a system that did not contain
comparable security provisions.”114
2. Federal Statutory Privacy Protection115

decision by a highly regulated utility company to discontinue service is not state action
unless the state was actively involved in the decision or otherwise coerced it). A mere
scheme of regulations is not sufficient for state action. See Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163, 176 (1972) (holding that mere regulations like liquor licensing are not sufficient state
action for the Fourteenth Amendment to apply). The “public function doctrine” stands for
the proposition that even a private enterprise may meet the state action requirement if it
performs a function that is traditionally and exclusively a government function. See Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (holding that company-towns serve a public or governmental
function so that the First Amendment freedom of speech protections apply).
108
Hearing on Biometrics and the Future of Money Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and
Int’l Monetary Policy Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv., 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998)
(statement of John D. Woodward, Attorney-at-Law) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979) and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
109
Id.
110
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
111
The New York State Controlled Substances Act of 1972, N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3300 et
seq. (McKinney, Supp. 1976-1977), required doctors and pharmacists to provide the
State with copies of prescriptions for medicines containing narcotics for which there is
a lawful and unlawful market. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591. See also, NOWAK &
ROTUNDA , supra note 84 at § 14.30.
112
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
113
Id at 597-98.
114
Id. at 605-606.
115
This section presents only a sampling of federal statutory provisions, with an emphasis on
those statutes specific to financial institutions. It is beyond the scope of this article to detail
every federal statute with privacy provisions. For a more in depth analysis, see Joel R.
Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier For Individual
Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 209-21 (1992).
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There are several federal statutes designed to protect a citizen’s
privacy. However, most of them provide protections only from a governmental
agency intruding into a citizen’s privacy. For example, the Privacy Act of
1974116 requires governmental executive agencies to follow certain procedures
in the collection and disclosure of the personal information that these agencies
collect.117 The Tax Reform Act of 1976118 similarly provides that the IRS should
limit the disclosure of an individual’s tax information.119
Congress enacted most of these statutes reactively, rather than
proactively. That is, Congress acted only as a reaction to some other event.
For example, Congress passed the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) 120 in
reaction to the stalking death of actress Rebecca Schaeffer. 121 The DPPA
regulates the indiscriminate dissemination of personal information contained in
motor vehicle records.122 Various states challenged the Act on several
bases,123 one of which was that Congress infringed on the states’ powers under
the Tenth Amendment.124 The federal circuit courts that ruled on the issue are
split, with two holding that the Act is unconstitutional, and two finding that it is a
valid exercise of Congressional power. 125
116

5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1999).
Id.
118
Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
119
See 26 U.S.C. § 6103.
120
18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1999).
121
After an unsuccessful attempt to present tokens of affection to Rebecca Schaeffer, John
Bardo hired a private investigator to determine his favorite actress’s home address. Tracy
Wilkinson, Murder Suspect’s “Obsession” Foretold in Studio Visit, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1989,
at 1. The private investigator obtained her address by purchasing the information from the
California Department of Motor Vehicles. Id. Bardo went to her house, where he found her
and shot her to death. Id. No federal or California law existed at the time to prevent the
release of information on a driver’s license. See Oliver J. Kim, Note, The Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act: On the Fast Track to National Harmony or Commercial Chaos?, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 223, 223-24 (1999) (presenting the background of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act
(DPPA) and concluding that the DPPA is a constitutionally permissible exercise of federal
authority).
122
For instance, states must provide drivers with an option to opt out of the mass distribution
of their information. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1999). There are several exceptions to the DPPA, such
as allowing the release of information to insurance companies, employers of commercial
drivers, and to law enforcement agencies. Id. See also Kim, supra note 121, at 241-43.
123
For a full discussion of the arguments for and against the constitutionality of the Driver’s
Privacy Protection Act, see Thomas J. Odom and Gregory S. Feder, Challenging the Federal
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act: The Next Step in Developing a Jurisprudence of ProcessOriented Federalism Under the Tenth Amendment, 53 U. M IAMI L. REV. 71 (1998) (noting that
states are challenging the DPPA based on the First, Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as on the Commerce Clause and the Guarantee Clause). See also, Kim,
117
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The future of the Act is unknown, as the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in one of the cases in May of 1999 and heard oral arguments
in November, 1999.126 Recently, Congress acted in response to the court
battles over the DPPA by amending the Act and placing restrictions in the
Appropriations Act for the Department of Transportation and related agencies
for the fiscal year 2000.127

supra note 121, at 223. Several states took in a considerable amount of money through the
sales of driver’s license information prior to the passage of the DPPA. Hearing in Support of
H.R. 3365 – the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm., (Feb 3, 1994) (statement of Janlori
Goldman, Director, American Civil Liberties Union). In one year, New York received $17
million, and Wisconsin made $8 million per year. Id. See also Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000,
1002 (7th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. May 11, 1999) (No. 98-1818).
In a related news article, a New Hampshire company was reported to purchase license
photographs from some states in hopes of building a national database for use in the fight
against retail fraud. Some States Sell Drivers’ Photos; W. Va. Motor Vehicle Official
Questions Legality of Sales, CHARLESTON DAILY M AIL, Feb. 2, 1999, at 10A. The company
designed a system that displayed the driver’s license photo of a shopper writing a check or
using a credit card to ensure her identity. Id. The company acquired 14 million photographs
of Florida drivers and more than 5 million from Colorado. Id.
124
The Tenth Amendment delegates those powers not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution to the States. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
125
See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that the Act is unconstitutional),
cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. 1753 (U.S. May 17, 1999) (No. 98-1464); Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281
(11th Cir. 1999) (same), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. July 6, 1999) (No. 99-61);
Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998)(determining that the Act is constitutional),
petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. May 11, 1999) (No. 98-1818); Oklahoma ex rel.
Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. U.S., 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1999) (same), petition for cert. filed,
67 U.S.L.W. 3684 (U.S. May 3, 1999) (No. 98-1760).
126
Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1999).
127
Pub. L. No. 106-69, 113 Stat. 986 (1999). The Act places certain restrictions on those states
accepting funds, such as not disseminating driver’s license personal information except as
permitted under the DPPA, and requiring a person’s consent before releasing a driver’s
license photograph, social security number, or medical and disability information. Id. at §
350. The Act further amends the DPPA by allowing the release of information in
certain instances only after the consumer gives express consent. Id. (modifying 18
U.S.C. § 2721(b)). This particular provision is not conditioned on the receipt of federal
funding, and, unlike the other restrictions, would continue to be in effect after the 2000
fiscal year. Id. See also Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief at 3-5, Reno v. Condon
(U.S.S.Ct. Oct. 20, 1999) (No. 98-1464).
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Like the DPPA, the Video Privacy Protection Act128 was enacted as a
reaction to other events, in this case, to the events surrounding the
confirmation hearings of Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork.129 Commonly
known as Bork’s Bill, the Video Privacy Protection Act was enacted only after a
newspaper article revealed which movies Bork rented from his neighborhood
video store.130 In commenting on the Video Privacy Protection Act, Senator
Leahy echoed the thoughts of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis,131 voiced
over 100 years ago, that Americans “want to be left alone.”132
Many statutes specifically regulate the banking industry. For instance,
after the Supreme Court, in United States v. Miller,133 held that microfilm
records of a bank customer’s activity were business records and not entitled to
personal privacy protection, Congress responded by enacting the Financial
Privacy Act of 1978.134 The Financial Privacy Act of 1978 protects certain
customer financial records from disclosure.135

128

18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1999). The Video Privacy Protection Act provides relief for the
unauthorized disclosure of video rental records in the form of civil remedies such as
actual damages of a minimum amount of $2500, punitive damages, and attorneys’
fees. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c). The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 similarly
regulates the disclosure of the viewing habits of cable subscribers. See 47 U.S.C. §
551 (1999).
129
See generally, Joshua D. Blackman, A Proposal for Federal Legislation Protecting
Informational Privacy Across the Private Sector, 9 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 431, 432-33 (1993) (providing examples of invasion of privacy due to the lack of laws
regulating the dissemination of personal information).
130
Aaron Epstein, Bork’s Right to Privacy Inspires Bill; Would Veil Library, Video
Borrowings, THE RECORD (NORTHERN NEW JERSEY), May 11, 1988, at A08. The article noted
that Bork’s interest in movies ranged from Alfred Hitchcock mysteries to sophisticated
comedies. Id. The article went on to say that Bork appeared to be a “PG-to-G” type of person
and that he rented “nothing racier than a fleetingly topless Vanessa Redgrave in ‘Blowup.’”
Id.
131
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). This
seminal article is discussed further in infra notes 156-157.
132
S. Rep. No. 100-599, at 6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342. Senator Leahy’s full
comment was “[privacy] is not a conservative or a liberal or moderate issue. It is an issue that
goes to the deepest yearnings of all Americans that we are free and we cherish our freedom
and we want our freedom. We want to be left alone.” Id.
133
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
134
12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1999). See Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of
High-Tech Government Surveillance, 77 W ASH. U. L. Q. 461, 482 (1999).
135
12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1999).
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The Fair Credit Reporting Act,136 (FCRP), also applies to financial
institutions.
The FCRP regulates the disclosure of consumer credit
information.137 By and large, the FCRP does not speak to the accumulation of
information, but does address the accuracy of a credit reporting agency’s
information.138 As a result of abusive, deceptive, and unfair practices in debt
collection, often resulting in invasions of privacy, 139 Congress enacted the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act of 1977.140
On November 16, 1999, President Clinton signed the Gramm-LeachBliley Act, also known as the Financial Modernization Act of 1999.141 The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act removes former restrictions on banks and other
financial institutions, allowing them to enter the securities market and to merge
with insurance companies.142 The new conglomerates can freely share
information with affiliates within the organization, without the consumer’s
consent.143
Currently, this is the only wide reaching federal legislation in the United
States to prevent financial institutions from buying and selling personal
information without the individual’s permission. The information distributed
would include the biometric information collected by the banking industry,
whether the information is gained from iris scans, fingerprints, or thumbprints.

136

15 U.S.C. § 1681–1681(u) (1999).
The FCRA prohibits consumer credit reporting agencies from disclosing consumer data
except in specified circumstances. See id.
138
See id. See also, Reidenberg, supra note 115, at 211-12.
139
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (1999).
140
15 U.S.C. § 1692-1692n (1999).
141
P.L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (to be codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15
U.S.C.).
142
See id. See also, Jane Bryant Quinn, Banking Overhaul May Lower Prices But Strip
Privacy, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 20, 1999, at B1. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repeals
portions of the Glass-Steagal Act, which forbid affiliations between banks and securities
firms, and amends the Bank Holding Company Act, which restricted affiliations between
banks and insurance companies. The White House, Statement by the President, M2
PRESSWIRE, Nov. 16, 1999.
143
See Quinn, supra note 142, at B1. (“Financial institutions will be able to hand out personal
information from your bank account, brokerage account or insurance records to all of its
divisions and affiliates.”). As part of the requirement that banks disclose their privacy policy,
consumers will know what information will be shared with the banks’ affiliates. Stephen Horn,
Representative, House, Modernizing Banking, Protecting Privacy, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS
RELEASES , Nov. 18, 1999.
137

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000

25

Akron Law Review, Vol. 33 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 5

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

However, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act provides exceptions to the
restrictions on the sharing of personal information.144 Financial institutions may
release information to a third party if the third party is acting on behalf of the
bank and will keep the information confidential.145 Similarly, the Act allows the
release of information to third parties with whom the banks have a joint
marketing arrangement.146 This means that some telemarketers will still have
access to private, personal information.147 The Act also provides exceptions for
law enforcement use.148
3. Privacy Protections Found in State Constitutions and Statutes
Many state constitutions provide a more explicit right to privacy of their
citizens than that found in the United States Constitution.149 However, most
require state action in order for the plaintiff to prevail.150
144

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
See Horn, supra note 143; Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
146
See Horn, supra note 143; Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
147
See Quinn, supra note 142.
148
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
149
Below is a sampling of state constitutional privacy provisions:
Alaska: “The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed.”
A LASKA CONST., art. I, § 22. Alaska’s constitutional privacy protections apply only to
state actors. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1129-30 (Alaska
1989).
Arizona: “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded,
without authority of law.” A RIZ. CONST . art. II, § 8. Courts in Arizona maintain that this
protection only applies against the State. See Hart v. Seven Resorts Inc., 947 P.2d
846, 850 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that Arizona’s constitutional right to privacy
does not extend to a claim brought for wrongful termination) (“This constitutional
provision was not intended to give rise to a private cause of action between private
individuals, but was intended as a prohibition on the State and has the same effect as
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.”).
California: “All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” CAL.
CONST . art.I, § 1. The Court of Appeals of California interpreted this provision in
Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). In
interpreting the ballot language of the 1972 amendment, the Court said that “[I]f the
collection and retention of information by private businesses were intended to be
excluded from the reach of the amendment, the ballot argument would not have
mentioned credit card applications and insurance policies. The argument’s repeated
references to information-gathering activities by both government and business lead
inexorably to the conclusion that the amendment was intended to reach both
governmental and nongovernmental conduct.” Id. at 198. Thus, the California
145
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Constitution protects against intrusions into privacy by private actors as well as state
actors. See also Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 643-44 (Cal. 1994).
Florida: “Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into the person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein. This
section shall not be construed to limit the public’s right of access to public records
and meetings as provided by law.” FLA. CONST . art I, § 23. For a discussion of
privacy law in Florida, see John Sanchez, Constitutional Privacy in Florida: Between
the Idea and the Reality Falls the Shadow, 18 NOVA L. REV. 775 (1994).
Hawaii: “The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest.” HAW. CONST . art. I, § 6. In
McCloskey v. Honolulu Police Dept., the Supreme Court of Hawaii referred to the
Hawaiian Constitutional Convention, which adopted this provision, and reported,
“[p]rivacy as used in this sense concerns the possible abuses in the use of highly
personal and intimate information in the hands of government or private parties but is
not intended to deter the government from the legitimate compilation and
dissemination of data.” 799 P.2d 953, 956 (Haw. 1990).
Illinois: “Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs
which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain
justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly.” ILL . CONST . art. I, § 12.
Louisiana: “Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of
privacy.” LA. CONST . art. I, § 5. Louisiana is one state whose privacy protection
applies to private actors as well as to those of the state. See Moresi v. Dept. of
Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So.2d 1081 (La. 1990). In construing the state constitution,
the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated, “the expression ‘no law shall’ was not used,
indicating that the protection goes beyond limiting state action. Id. at 1092. The court
also noted that invasion of privacy involves a “fear of unreasonable gathering and
dissemination of information on individuals through use of computer data banks.” Id.
Montana: “The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.” MONT .
CONST . art. II, § 10. The Supreme Court of Montana interpreted this provision as
applying only to state actors. State v. Long, 700 P.2d 153, 157 (Mont. 1985) (“[I]n
accordance with well-established constitutional principles, we hold that the privacy
section of the Montana Constitution contemplates privacy invasion by state action
only.”).
New York: A bill proposing a state Constitutional Amendment to establish an inherent
right of personal privacy is currently in the legislature. See A.B. 1174, 222nd Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (“The inherent right of each person to personal privacy shall
not be infringed.”).
South Carolina: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions
of privacy shall not be violated. . . .” S.C. CONST . art. I, § 10.
Washington: “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded,
without authority of law.” W ASH. CONST . art. I, § 7. Washington’s constitutional
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Some states have criminalized the invasion of privacy. 151 Other states
have merely codified the common law actions for invasion of privacy. 152 A
uniform law regulating the dissemination of personal information just does not
exist. The state legislatures in California and Massachusetts are responding to
this gap by introducing bills that explicitly apply to biometric data.153 With state
constitutional and statutory protections as varied as they are, personal
information is not adequately protected, especially given the fact that many
commercial entities operate across state lines.154
4. Actions Under Common Law in Tort

protections apply only to actions involving state actors. See State v. Farmer, 911
P.2d 1030, 1033 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the defendant’s state
constitutional right to privacy was not infringed by a warrantless seizure of store
receipts) (“The constitutional right to privacy is implicated only if the actors were
functioning as agents or instrumentalities of the State.”)
150
See generally, Timothy O. Lenz, “Rights Talk” About Privacy in State Courts, 60 ALB. L.
REV. 1613, 1616 (1997). See supra note 107 on what constitutes state action. Louisiana is one
state that does not limit invasion of privacy to state actors. Lenz, supra note 150, at 1616.
California and Hawaii are two others. See supra note 149.
151
Delaware: Section 1335 of Delaware’s Code makes violation of privacy a class A
misdemeanor. A person is guilty of invasion of privacy if he performs a number of activities
that invade one’s privacy, including trespassing, intercepting a message, or installing or
using listening devices. DEL. CODE A NN. tit. 11, § 1335(a) (1999).
Maine: Section 511 of Maine’s Code provides that a violation of privacy is a Class D
crime. M E. REV. STAT. A NN. tit. 17-A, § 511 (1998). A person is guilty of violation of
privacy if he trespasses with intent to overhear or observe a person in a private place or
installs any device for observing, hearing, recording or amplifying sounds or events in a
private place without that person’s consent. § 511(1).
Massachusetts: “A person shall have a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious
interference with his privacy.” M ASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 1B (1999).
152
Rhode Island is one state that codified the common law causes of action for invasion of
property. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28.1 (1997). The common law protections of privacy
are discussed at infra notes 156-182 and accompanying text.
153
California Senate Bill 71 would prohibit anyone from using biometric identifiers unless
specified conditions are met. S.B. 71, 1999-00 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1999). The data must be
used solely for identification purposes, cannot be sold or transferred to third parties, and
must be protected from unauthorized access. Id. A similar bill was introduced in
Massachusetts. See H.B. 4483, 181st Gen. Ct., 1999 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999).
154
See Thomas B. Kearns, Note, Technology and the Right to Privacy: The Convergence of
Surveillance and Information Privacy Concerns, 7 W M. & M ARY BILL RTS . J. 975, 1003-1009
(1999) (noting that constitutionally-based safeguards, based on a change in judicial
interpretation, would be most effective for multistate companies).
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Because of the necessity of state action in order to utilize federal and
state constitutional protections,155 many plaintiffs turn to the common law to
provide redress for any invasion of privacy. The development of privacy rights
under common law began with the often-quoted, famous law review article of
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis of 1890.156 In that article, Warren and
Brandeis characterized privacy as the “right to be let alone.”157 In 1960, Dean
William Prosser took the development of the right to privacy a step further by
classifying invasions of privacy into four distinct torts.158 These four categories
are (1) appropriation,159 (2) unreasonable intrusion upon the plaintiff’s
seclusion or solitude,160 (3) public disclosure of private facts,161 and (4) false
light in the public eye.162 These distinctions were later adopted in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.163
155

See supra note 107. But see, supra note 150.
Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). “The
recognition and development of the so-called ‘right of privacy’ is perhaps the outstanding
illustration of the influence of legal periodicals upon the courts. Prior to the year 1890, no
English or American court ever had granted relief expressly based upon the invasion of such
a right.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 849
(5th ed. 1984).
157
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 156, at 195. However, Thomas Cooley is said to have
coined the phrase “the right to be let alone” in 1888 in COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS, at 29 (2d
ed. 1888). KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, § 117, at 849.
158
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF . L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
159
The tort of appropriation is “an invasion of privacy whereby one person takes the name or
likeness of another for commercial gain.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 98 (7th ed. 1999). “It is
the plaintiff’s name as a symbol of his identity that is involved here, and not as a mere name. .
. . It is only when he makes use of the name to pirate the plaintiff’s identity for some
advantage of his own. . . that he becomes liable.” KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, § 117 at 852.
See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
160
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion is “an action for invasion of privacy, a highly
offensive invasion of another person’s seclusion or private life. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
829 (7th ed. 1999). It requires an “intentional interference with another’s interest in solitude or
seclusion, either as to his person or to his private affairs or concerns.” KEETON ET AL., supra
note 156, § 117 at 854. See infra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
161
Public disclosure of private facts is the highly offensive and objectionable publication of
private information. KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, § 117 at 856. It is also described as “the
public revelation of some aspect of a person’s private life without a legitimate public purpose.
The disclosure is actionable in tort if the disclosure would be highly objectionable to a
reasonable person.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1243 (7th ed. 1999). See infra notes 174-76 and
accompanying text.
162
A false light claim consists of “a plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant attributed to the
plaintiff views that he or she does not hold and placed the plaintiff before the public in a
highly offensive and untrue manner.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 619 (7th ed. 1999). False light
privacy is a variation of defamation. Murphy, supra note 85, at 2390. “The paradigmatic case
156
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The tort of appropriation provides a remedy against someone who uses
another’s name or likeness for his own benefit.164 This has also been called
the “right to publicity.”165 The right is essentially the right to “control the
commercial use of his or her identity.”166 The Restatement Second of Torts
refers to this action as “appropriation of name or likeness.”167

of false light is the publication of a person’s photograph beside an article on drug abuse,
though the person pictured is not a drug user.” Id. See also, infra notes 177-82 and
accompanying text.
163
Murphy, supra note 85, at 2390. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A provides:
(Error! Main Document Only.)
One who invades the right of
privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting harm to the
interests of the other.
(Error! Main Document Only.)
The right of privacy is invaded by
(Error! Main Document Only.) unreasonable intrusion upon the
seclusion of another, as stated in § 652B; or
(Error! Main Document Only.) appropriation of the other’s name or
likeness, as stated in § 652C; or
(Error! Main Document Only.) unreasonable publicity given to the
other’s private life, as stated in § 652D; or
(Error! Main Document Only.) publicity that unreasonably places
the other in a false light before the public, as stated in § 652E.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
164
See also, Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial
Dissemination of Personal Information, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1412 (1987).
165
Murphy, supra note 85, at 2391.
166
J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A Tribute, 34 UCLA
L. REV. 1703, 1704 (1987) (providing the history of the right of publicity).
167
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C states: “One who appropriates to his own
use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy.” RESTATEMENT (S ECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
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Intrusion upon seclusion168 consists of one’s intentional interference
with another’s privacy. 169 Intrusion upon seclusion requires an intentional
intrusion, so an action will not lie by an intrusion of a purely accidental
nature.170 Another requirement for this tort is that the intrusion be
unreasonable and highly offensive.171 The best example of an action for
intrusion is illustrated in Galella v. Onassis.172 In Galella, Jacqueline Onassis
succeeded in an invasion of privacy action against a photographer who
followed her and her children practically everywhere.173
The public disclosure of private facts is a cause of action for the
publicity of a highly objectionable kind of private information.174 The
information made public must be regarded as “highly offensive and
objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.”175 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts adds the requirement that the information not
be of legitimate concern to the public.176

168

“One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Id. at § 652B
(1977).
169
KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, § 117 at 854.
170
See id. at 855.
171
Id.
172
487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
173
To be completely accurate, Ronald Galella originally sued Ms. Onassis. She
counterclaimed for invasion of privacy, among other claims. Id. at 998. Galella was also found
guilty of harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, and the
commercial exploitation of the defendant’s personality. Id. at 994. The Court also found that
Galella “intentionally physically touched Ms. Onassis and her daughter, caused fear of
physical contact in his frenzied attempts to get their pictures, followed [Mrs. Onassis] too
closely in an automobile, [and] endangered the safety of the children while they were
swimming, water skiing, and horseback riding.” Id.
174
KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, § 117 at 856.
175
Id. at 856-57.
176
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D. The full text of this section is as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter
publicized is of a kind that
(Error! Main Document Only.)would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and
(Error! Main Document Only.)is not of legitimate concern to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
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The last category is publicity that places the individual in a false light in
the public eye.177 It is said to often resemble defamation, although the two can
be distinguished.178 An action for false light publicity “is to protect a person’s
interest in being let alone,”179 while defamation protects a person’s good
reputation.180 The publicity must be of a kind that is highly offensive.181 If the
plaintiff is a public figure or the matter is one of public interest, Constitutional
protections of freedom of speech apply to these actions.182
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Privacy Implications in the Use of Biometric Identifiers in the Banking
Industry

The level of intrusion into privacy by the banking industry’s growing use
of biometric identifiers depends upon which method of biometrics is selected
and how the data is stored. Because this information is given voluntarily,
consumers are not as protected as they otherwise would be.183 The main
concern centers on which biometric identifier is chosen, since certain medical
and health information may be inadvertently captured by the scan.184 The
177

The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes the tort of false light publicity as:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the
other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy, if:
(Error! Main Document Only.)
the false light in which the other
was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(Error! Main Document Only.)
the actor had knowledge of or acted
in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and
the false light in which the other would be placed.
Id. at § 652E.
178
KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, § 117 at 864.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 865. For a discussion of the standard to be applied in these cases, see New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Generally, actual malice is required, defined as
either knowingly false, or with reckless disregard as to whether the information was false or
not. Id. at 279. “If the matter involves the public interest, the plaintiff must prove the
defendant’s malice.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 619 (7th ed. 1999).
183
“Whereas the consumer voluntarily consents to give identification information to a private
sector institution, federal courts generally turn a blind eye.” Woodward, supra note 38, at
102.
184
Woodward, supra note 18, at 115. (“[P]rivacy concerns may be implicated because in
addition to the identification data captured, information about a person’s health and medical
history may also be incidentally obtained.”). By examining an individual’s iris or retina, a
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unauthorized dissemination of medical information has long been closely
scrutinized by the courts.185

doctor can diagnose diseases such as diabetes, high blood pres sure, and arteriosclerosis. Id.
Similarly, doctors can detect diseases specific to the iris and retina upon an exam. Id.
As Dr. F.P. Nasrallah, an Assistant Professor of Ophthalmology at George
Washington University explains, “examination of both the iris and the
retina provides important diagnostic clues about a person’s health, the
retina more so.” Nasrallah adds: “If I see certain lesions on the retina, I can
become suspicious that the patient has AIDS, diabetes or high blood
pressure for example.” Intravenous drug abuse can also be suspected
from a retina exam.
Id.
Similar concerns are implicated with fingerprint scanning. See id. “For example, Dr.
Marvin M. Schuster, director of the division of digestive diseases at Johns Hopkins Bayview
Medical Center, has discovered a ‘mysterious relationship’ between an uncommon fingerprint
pattern, known as a digital arch, and a medical disorder called chronic, intestinal pseudoobstruction (CIP) which affects 50,000 people nationwide.” Id at 116. CIP is “a motility
disorder, caus[ing] its victims ‘to experience excruciating physical pain, vomiting, nausea,
alternating bouts of severe constipation and diarrhea, and debilitating weight loss.’” Id. at
n.146 (quoting Gastroenterology: Fingerprinting GI Disease, JOHNS HOPKINS PHYSICIAN
UPDATE, Apr. 1996, at 5). Certain patterns on the feet and hands may indicate chromosomal
disorders like Down Syndrome, Turner Syndrome, and Klinefelter Syndrome. Id. at 116.
Unusual fingerprint patterns may also indicate CIP, breast cancer, leukemia, and Rubella
Syndrome. Id. Some researchers have also reported a link between asymmetric fingerprint
patterns and homosexuality. Id. (noting that the findings are controversial among the
scientific and gay communities).
The International Biometric Industry Association, a nonprofit trade organization
composed of the manufacturers, integrators, and end users of biometric technology, states
that the digital code of the biometric identifier cannot be reconstructed, or reverse engineered,
to reveal a person’s identity or to obtain a true image of the biometric identifier. See
International Biometric Industry Association, Frequently Asked Questions About Biometric
Technology (last modified Mar. 28, 1999) <http://www.ibia.org/faqs.htm>. The digital code, a
mathematical model, is actually what is stored, not an image of the scan itself. See Slater,
supra note 52, at A1. It is possible, given the rapid advances in technology, that someday
technology will reach a point where scientists can indeed reconstruct an accurate picture and
doctors can determine medical information from a digital code. This is merely one reason why
any privacy protection solution must be broad enough to cover future developments in
technology. See Kearns, supra note 154, at 1002 (noting that past experience illustrates that
current legislation is ineffective against new developments in technology by providing the
example of Congress enacting the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, because
the Wiretap Act of 1968 did not apply to cellular phone transmissions, pagers, or e-mail).
185
“Information about one’s body and state of health is a matter which the individual is
ordinarily entitled to retain within the ‘private enclave where he may lead a private life.’”
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 638 F.2d 570, 576 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting United
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In ATMs where the biometric information is stored in a card, there is little
implication for invasion of privacy, provided that the banks do not store a copy
of the digital code in a separate database.186 In these systems, the biometric
identifier is used for verification – that is, ensuring that the person in
possession of the card is the one actually authorized to use it.187 The biometric
blueprint of the iris is located on the card itself.188 If the card is lost or stolen,
no one else can use it. The data is not stored in a database, where it can be
accessed by the prying eyes of computer hackers or distributed to other
organizations.189 The banks utilizing this type of system have the added
advantage of needing small amounts of storage capabilities.190
The systems that rely on biometric scanning for identification
purposes,191 that is, comparing the individual to all those enrolled, implicate
more concerns over privacy. The digital code extracted from the iris or
fingerprint is stored in the financial institution’s database.192 There, the
information should be subject to heightened security measures to protect the
data from computer hackers and other unauthorized access.193 Banks should
also be restricted from transferring that information to other entities.
B. Possible Sources of Protection for Biometric Information
The United States Constitution provides no protection for biometric

States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting)). “In the cases
in which a court has allowed some intrusion into the zone of privacy surrounding medical
records, it has usually done so only after finding that the societal interest in disclosure
outweighs the privacy interest on the specific facts of the case.” Id. at 578. Nevertheless, in
Westinghouse, the Court held that the release of a private sector employee’s medical records
to a government agency was allowed upon a showing of governmental interest. Id. at 577.
186
If financial institutions store biometric data in a database, the bank retains control over it
and can transfer it along with any other data. See Siuru, supra note 21, at 41.
187
See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text for the differences between identification
and verification.
188
Siuru, supra note 21, at 41.
189
See id.
190
Iris recognition requires a large amount of computer memory for the database. See
Chandrasekaran, supra note 37, at HO1. By storing the digital code on the card itself, rather
than on a master computer, the financial institutions require much less in the way of computer
memory and storage. See Siuru, supra note 21, at 41; Woodward, supra note 18, at 110.
191
See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between
identification and verification).
192
See Nicholson, supra note 80, at 100.
193
See International Biometric Industry Association, Frequently Asked Questions About
Biometric Technology (last modified Mar. 28, 1999).
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information gathered throughout the financial industry. The financial
institutions are not state actors. Furthermore, federal statutes regulating the
financial industry deal solely with specific types of information, and not
biometric information.194
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act195 represents a good start in the
protection of informational privacy. However, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
implicates concerns over the privacy of personal information.196 While some
privacy protections were included in the Act,197 others still need to be
addressed.198
Prior to granting or extending credit, a bank can consult with its
affiliated insurance company to ensure the customer is a risk worth taking.199
The information shared between the affiliates would likely include the biometric
information collected by the banks. Customers should be able to protect
themselves from this type of intrusion into privacy. The privacy of biometric
information gathered by banks cannot be adequately protected through current
federal sources of privacy rights.
Similarly, state constitutions and statutes are inadequate when it comes
to the protection of biometric data. Currently, with the exception of pending
legislation in California and Massachusetts,200 there are no laws that serve to
prevent the banking industry from disseminating biometric information.
Furthermore, fifty different states can each have their own law, resulting in fifty
different laws.201
194

See supra notes 134-148 and accompanying text (detailing current statutes regulating the
financial service industry).
195
See supra notes 141-148 and accompanying text.
196
See Quinn, supra note 142, at B1.
197
Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, banking customers can choose to opt out of having
their personal financial information shared with third parties, but not with banking affiliates.
See Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). See also, Stephen Horn, Representative, House,
Modernizing Banking, Protecting Privacy, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS RELEASES , Nov. 18, 1999.
The Act also requires banks to disclose their privacy policy to customers on a yearly basis.
Id.
198
One area that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act did not address was allowing the consumer to
opt out of sharing information between affiliates.
199
See Quinn, supra note 142, at B1. Financial institutions can share their information with
affiliates without first obtaining the customer’s consent. See Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(1999).
200
See supra note 153.
201
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act allows states to override the privacy provisions if the state
laws provide greater consumer protection than the federal protections. See Gramm-LeachBliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999); Lenders Hit Privacy Stumbling Blocks,
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The common law actions also provide no protection. The collection and
distribution of biometric data does not fit neatly into any one category. The tort
of appropriation does not apply, as banks are not appropriating “the name or
likeness” of the customer for the banks’ commercial gain.202 Appropriation
involves a commercial use of one’s identity, action that the banks are not
taking.203
Dissemination of biometric information does not rise to
“unreasonable or highly offensive” conduct, as required by the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion.204 The torts of public disclosure of private facts and false light
privacy do not apply, because the banks are not publicizing any “highly
objectionable” information.205 As one author notes, Prosser’s categorization of
invasion of privacy into the four common law torts “has effectively frozen the
development of privacy law despite the creation of new technologies that
detrimentally affect individual privacy.”206
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR PRIVACY PROTECTION LEGISLATION207
The biometric information gathered by the banking industry will not be
adequately protected by federal or state constitutions,208 current statutes,209 or
CREDIT RISK M ANAGEMENT REPORT , Nov. 15, 1999; Lisa Fickenscher, Reporter Notebook:
States Expected to Tighten Reform’s Privacy Provisions, A MERICAN BANKER, Nov. 19, 1999,
at 11 (“‘The worse scenario is 50 different privacy regimes.’” (quoting Christine Varney, a
former Federal Trade Commissioner)).
202
See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text (explaining the requirements for the
appropriation tort).
203
Id.
204
See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text (noting the requirements for the tort of
intrusion upon seclusion).
205
But see, Graham, supra note 164, at 1413 (suggesting that the public disclosure of private
facts tort would be the mo st suitable for protection of information privacy but also noting that
the courts have defined “publicity” rather narrowly). See supra notes 174-82 and
accompanying text (detailing the requirements for the torts of public disclosure of private
facts and false light privacy).
206
Graham, supra, note 164, at 1406.
207
One author notes that the best solution would provide protection from many difference
sources, such as laws and regulations, industry norms, and business practices. Joel R.
Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80
IOWA L. REV. 497, 511 (1995). Reidenberg also urges the creation of a federal privacy
commission to oversee informational privacy. See id. at 551.
208
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
209
Some state legislatures have reacted to the growing use of biometrics with legislation to
control the collection, use, and distribution of biometric information. See supra note 153.
Although bills in the California and Massachusetts legislatures would protect the privacy of
biometric information, these two states are the exception, rather than the rule. Congress
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actions in common law. 210 Therefore, it is up to the federal legislature to
regulate the accumulation and distribution of biometric information.211
Thus far, Congress has been silent on the widespread use and
regulation of biometrics in the private sector. However, Congress can regulate
the transfer of biometric information. Congress has the authority to regulate
conduct that concerns or interferes with interstate commerce through the broad
powers delegated through the Commerce Clause.212 State governments can
regulate technology, provided that the state statute or regulation does not
interfere with federal law. 213
In response to weaknesses in the privacy protection provisions of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, several members of Congress have introduced
legislation designed to more adequately protect consumer information in the
financial industry. 214 Those bills, in combination with California’s pending

needs to act in order to protect all American citizens.
210
See supra notes 202-206 and accompanying text. For another view see Graham, supra note
164, at 1428. (urging the creation of an action for the tortious commercial dissemination of
private facts to protect information privacy). Another author notes that courts are better
suited to protect information privacy, because the courts can keep pace with technology and
are not as easily swayed by pressure from interest groups, as are legislatures. Fenrich, supra
note 9, at 980-83. But see, Petersen, supra note 4, at 165 (noting that cases often take years to
get through the court system).
211
Cf. Kearns, supra note 154, at 1002 (noting that legislation is not sufficient, because laws
can easily be amended or repealed).
212
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. See also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.1 at 274 (4th ed. 1991).
213
When a state statute conflicts with a federal provision, the federal statute preempts that of
the state, due to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI,
§ 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”). A state statute may be explicitly preempted if the federal
statute expressly states that it preempts the laws of the state. Gade v. Nat’l Solid
Waste Management Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). Federal law may impliedly
preempt state law when the state’s regulation conflicts with the purpose and objectives
of the federal statute or if compliance with both laws is physically impossible. Id.
State statutes can also be preempted if Congress intended to regulate the entire field.
Id.
214
See Leahy Banking Bill Calls For Tougher Privacy Rules, CONGRESS DAILY, Nov. 17,
1999; Consumer’s Right To Financial Privacy Act, H.R. 3320, 106th Cong. (1999); Consumer’s
Right To Financial Privacy Act, S. 1903, 106th Cong. (1999); Financial Information Privacy and
Security Act, S. 1924, 106th Cong. (1999). H.R. 3320 and S. 1903 contain the same provisions,
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legislation restricting the use of biometric information,215 can and should be
used as a model for a uniform federal statute regulating the transfer of
biometric data.
The current bills in Congress provide for an opt-in provision, rather
than an opt-out provision.216 An opt-in provision allows the consumer to make
an informed choice as to whether he will allow the financial institutions to
distribute his personal data,217 and to whom it will be disclosed.218 Rather than
informing the banks he does not want them to share his data with other
companies,219 the consumer must give the banks explicit permission to
distribute his personal information.220 These provisions apply to banking
affiliates as well as third parties.221 If the customer consents to such disclosure,
he will also be afforded the opportunity to examine and dispute the accuracy of
any personal information that was made available to other entities.222
California Senate Bill 71 prohibits the use of biometrics for identification
or verification except when certain safeguards are in place to protect the
data.223 The data shall only be used for the purposes of verifying one’s

and were just introduced in the different houses of Congress.
215
S.B. 71, 1999-00 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1999).
216
Consumer’s Right To Financial Privacy Act, S. 1903, 106th Cong. § 502(b)
(1999). (Financial institutions are prohibited “from making available any nonpublic
personal information to any affiliate or other person that is not an employee or
agent of the institution, unless the consumer to whom the information pertains (A)
has affirmatively consented . . . ; and (B) has not withdrawn consent.”). Advocates
for opt-in provisions claim that opt-out provisions put the burden on the consumer to
act. Fickenscher, supra note 201. Fickenscher quotes Massachusetts Lt.
Governor Jane Swift as stating that “[i]t takes an enormous amount of selfeducation by consumers to understand just exactly to whom they need to say
‘No.’” Id. Oftentimes, opt-out agreements confuse the customer to the point that
he thinks his information is protected, when in reality, it is not. See id.
217
An opt-in provision “force[s] companies to seek consumers’ permission before
using or selling personal information.” Fickenscher, supra note 201, at 11.
218
Consumer’s Right To Financial Privacy Act, S. 1903, 106th Cong. § 502(b)(2)
(1999).
219
Opt-out provisions “let consumers remove themselves from these marketing
programs.” Fickenscher, supra note 201.
220
See Consumer’s Right To Financial Privacy Act, S. 1903, 106th Cong. § 502(b)
(1999).
221
See Consumer’s Right To Financial Privacy Act, S. 1903, 106th Cong. §
502(b)(1); § 502(d) (1999).
222
Consumer’s Right To Financial Privacy Act, S. 1903, 106th Cong. § 502(c)
(1999).
223
S.B. 71, 1999-00 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1999).
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identity. 224 The information cannot be distributed to third parties.225 Finally,
any databases containing biometric data must be adequately protected.226
Similar to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the pending Consumer’s Right To
Financial Privacy Act, California’s bill provides exemptions for law enforcement
and other governmental agencies.227
A uniform federal legislation, one that adequately addresses biometric
information and provides the necessary protection of that data, can be based
on these acts. A model based on these acts would include opt-in provisions, a
system for review and correction of inaccurate data, and requirements that the
database be secure from unauthorized users.
An article on current privacy protections would not be complete without
at least acknowledging actions other countries have taken. European
countries have enacted sweeping provisions for data protection.228 The
objective of the European Directive for Data Protection (“Directive”) is to
“protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in
particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal
data.”229 A provision in the Directive restricts the transfer of data to countries

224

Id.
Id. (“[T]he person shall not sell, transmit, exchange, or otherwise provide to third
parties biometric identifiers or data containing biometric identifiers in the person’s
possession.”).
226
Id. (“[T]hese procedures shall be designed to make that data as secure from
tampering and unauthorized access as current procedures used by the person to
secure an individual’s confidential information.”).
227
California Senate Bill 71 does not affect biometric data collection for use by the
State Department of Social Services or the Department of Motor Vehicles. See id.
228
See, e.g., Council Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 Oct. 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J.
(L281) (Nov. 23, 1995), available at <http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/lif/dat/en_395L0046.html> (visited Nov. 7, 1999) (hereinafter EU Directive).
The EU Directive defines personal data broadly enough to encompass biometric
data. EU Directive, supra, art. 2 (“‘personal data’ shall mean any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable
person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference
to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural, or social identity”). For an in-depth
analysis of the provision of the EU Directive, see Fred H. Cate, The EU Data
Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the Public Interest, 80 IOWA L. REV.
431 (1995).
229
EU Directive, supra, art. 1
225
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whose privacy protections are not adequate.230 This provision could cripple
multinational American corporations wishing to receive information from
European Union member countries.231 This is merely one more reason why it is
imperative that Congress enacts a uniform law protecting information privacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the Supreme Court noted in Whalen v. Roe, 232 there is a “threat to
privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in
computerized data banks or other massive government files.”233 The threat
that the Supreme Court noted is very real, even more so today with the
increased use of biometrics in industry.
Currently no federal or state constitutional source of privacy will protect
biometric information from being disseminated by financial institutions without
the individual’s consent or knowledge. Current federal statutes, including the
recently-enacted and highly praised Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act234 are
inadequate. Similarly, the common law tort system cannot adequately address
the issue. Uniform federal legislation is the only viable method of protecting an
individual’s biometric information. A federal statute based on current California
law and pending bills should be adopted to protect American’s biometric
identities
.
Lisa Jane McGuire

230

See EU Directive, supra note 228, art. 25. See also, Paul M. Schwartz,
European Data Protection Law and Restrictions on International Data Flows , 80
IOWA L. REV. 471 (1995); Patrick J. Murray, The Adequacy Standard Under Directive
95/46/EC: Does U.S. Data Protection Meet This Standard?, 21 FORDHAM INT ’L L.J.
932 (1998) (analyzing the adequacy of current protection standards in the United
States).
231
See Murray, supra note 230, at 938 (“[t]he Article 25 requirement that a third
country have adequate protection could lead to a data or information embargo.”);
Schwartz, supra note 230, at 487 (“No provision in the Directive has potentially
greater consequences for the United States.”).
232
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
233
Id. at 605.
234
Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). See also The White House, Statement
by the President, M2 PRESSWIRE , Nov. 16, 1999.
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